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Cryptanalysis of an MPEG-video Encryption
Scheme Based on Secret Huffman Tables
Shujun Li, Guanrong Chen, Albert Cheung and Kwok-Tung Lo
Abstract— This paper studies the security of a recently-
proposed MPEG-video encryption scheme based on secret
Huffman tables. Our cryptanalysis shows that: 1) the key
space of the encryption scheme is not sufficiently large against
divide-and-conquer (DAC) attack and known-plaintext attack;
2) it is possible to decrypt a cipher-video with a partially-
known key, thus dramatically reducing the complexity of the
DAC brute-force attack in some cases; 3) its security against
the chosen-plaintext attack is very weak. Some experimental
results are included to support the cryptanalytic results with a
brief discuss on how to improve this MPEG-video encryption
scheme.
Keywords: MPEG video; data encryption; cryptanalysis;
Huffman table; ciphertext-only attack; known-plaintext attack;
chosen-plaintext attack; divide-and-conquer (DAC) attack;
brute-force attack; partial-key attack
I. INTRODUCTION
The extensive use of digital images and videos in today’s
digital world makes the security and privacy issues more
and more important. To fulfill such an increasing demand,
various encryption algorithms have been proposed in recent
years as possible solutions to content protection of digital
images and videos [1]–[11], among which MPEG videos
attract special attention due to its prominent prevalence in
consumer electronic markets [12]–[14]. As an important
way of designing MPEG-video encryption schemes, secret
Huffman tables have been suggested in some designs [3],
[8], [15]–[19].
The MPEG-video encryption scheme proposed in [15]
(i.e., Algorithm 1 in [3]) is a light-weight scheme, which
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encrypts the plain-video by shuffling VLC (variable-length
coding) entries of same size in each Huffman table. How-
ever, because the bit length of each VLC codeword does not
change, the position of each VLC codeword in the video
stream does not change either. Thus, an attacker can uniquely
locate (and thus determine) all VLC codewords contained
in the cipher-video stream, if the plain-video stream or an
independent part (such as a picture or a slice) is known. Once
all distinct VLC codewords are obtained, the whole secret
Huffman table is uniquely reconstructed and the encryption
scheme is broken. That is, this light-weight scheme is not
secure against known/chosen-plaintext attacks. In addition,
as pointed out in [3], the key space of this encryption scheme
is very limited (especially for Huffman tables with a small
number of VLC entries), so even a brute-force attack may
become feasible.
The MPEG-video encryption scheme proposed in [16] can
be considered as an enhanced version of that in [15]. In this
scheme, five different Huffman tables are shuffled separately
and the shuffling operations are generalized to work on VLC
entries with different sizes, in the hope that the key space
can be enlarged and the security against plaintext attacks can
be improved. Furthermore, as a second guard on the security,
random bit flipping operations are also introduced to further
encrypt each secret Huffman table.
In [8], [17]–[19], multiple Huffman tables (MHT) are
introduced, from which one table is secretly chosen for the
encryption of each VLC codeword. A so-called “Huffman
tree mutation process” is also proposed in [8], [17], [18] to
derive more candidate Huffman tables from several original
tables.
This paper mainly focuses on security problems with
the MPEG-video encryption scheme proposed in [16]. Our
cryptanalysis shows that this scheme is not sufficiently
secure against DAC (divide-and-conquer) ciphertext-only
attack, partial-key attack and known-plaintext attack, and
very weak against chosen-plaintext attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, a brief introduction to the MPEG-video encryption
scheme under study is given. Then, the main cryptanalysis
results are presented in detail in Sect. III, with some ex-
perimental results. Finally Section IV gives a discussion on
how to improve the security of the MPEG-video encryption
scheme, and the last section concludes this paper.
2II. MPEG-VIDEO ENCRYPTION SCHEME UNDER STUDY
Given an uncompressed video as the input, an MPEG1
encoder compresses the video stream frame by frame in the
following steps [12], [13]:
1) (optional, for interlaced MPEG-2 videos only) separate
a frame into two field-pictures: a top field and a bottom
field;
2) employ differential encoding and motion compensa-
tion techniques to remove most redundancy existing
between adjacent pictures;
3) divide the current picture into a number of slices,
each of which is composed of one or more 16 × 16
macroblocks;
4) decompose each macroblock into 6, 8 or 12 blocks
of size 8 × 8: 4 luminance blocks; 1, 2 or 4 Cb
chrominance blocks; 1, 2 or 4 Cr chrominance blocks;
5) perform DCT (discrete cosine transform) for each 8×8
block, and then quantize the 64 DCT coefficients with
a quantiser marix;
6) transform the 8 × 8 block into a 1-D vector in one
of two possible zigzag scanning orders, and then
represent all 64 quantized DCT coefficients (except
DC coefficients in intra-blocks) with a number of RLE
(run-length encoding) pairs;
7) encode most DCT coefficients (i.e., RLE pairs) and
all motion vectors using VLC (variable-length-coding)
codewords under the control of some Huffman tables,
and represent other DCT coefficients with fix-length
bits strings.
A Huffman table is a two-column tale for realizing the
Huffman coding algorithm [20], [21], which is an entropy
encoding algorithm and transforms an input value into a
VLC-codeword with the following rule: the more frequently
the input value occurs, the shorter the corresponding VLC-
codeword should be, and vice versa. In such a way, one
can compress the input data in a lossless form. There are in
total 15 Huffman tables used in MPEG-2 standards [13] (less
tables are used in MPEG-1 standard [12]), among which ten
tables are used to encode data elements in various headers
and the following five tables are used to encode visual
information – DCT coefficients in each block and motion
vectors in each macroblock:
• Table B-10: for encoding motion vectors;
• Table B-12: for encoding the bit size of the differential
values of DC coefficients in intra luminance blocks;
• Table B-13: for encoding the bit size of the differential
values of DC coefficients in intra chrominance blocks;
• Table B-14: for encoding all DCT coefficients of non-
intra blocks and AC coefficients of intra blocks with
intra vlc format=0, where intra vlc format is a picture-
1To keep the description simpler, here we mainly considers MEPG-1/2
encoder. For special features of MPEG-4 encoder with respect to MPEG-
1/2, see [14] for more details.
specific flag defined in MPEG-2 standard (which is
always set to be 0 for MPEG-1 videos);
• Table B-15 (not used in MPEG-1 standard): for en-
coding all AC coefficients of intra blocks with in-
tra vlc format=1.
As an example of the Huffman tables, Table I shows Table
B-12 used in MPEG-2 standard.
TABLE I
TABLE B-12 IN MPEG-2 STANDARD: VARIABLE LENGTH CODES FOR
dct dc size luminance
Variable length code dct dc size luminance
100 0
00 1
01 2
101 3
110 4
1110 5
11110 6
111110 7
1111110 8
11111110 9
111111110 10
111111111 11
The encryption scheme proposed in [16] is designed by
encrypting the original Huffman tables, i.e., using different
(secret) Huffman tables to replace the original ones. The
aforementioned five Huffman tables, B-10, B-12, B-13, B-
14 and B-15, are chosen to be encrypted separately. These
secret Huffman tables are derived from the original ones by
combining the following two encryption operations.
• Shuffling VLC-codewords: grouping all VLC-
codewords into several subsets according to their
bit lengths, and then randomly shuffling these
VLC-codewords within each subset.
• Random bit flipping: randomly flipping the last bit of
each VLC-codeword, and adjusting (if needed) other
VLC-codewords to keep the prefix rule valid.
After encrypting all the five Huffman tables with both of the
above two methods, the bit length of some VLC-codewords
should be slightly changed to enhance the security against
plaintext attacks (as discussed in Sect. I of this paper) but
should not be changed too much, to avoid a large influence
on compression efficiency.
In [16], the key space was estimated by enumerating all
“good” encryption methods2 of the shuffling operation and
the random bit flipping operation, as shown in Table II. Then,
the key space size was calculated to be the product of the
five numbers given in the table:
(3!)×
(
7!× 26
)
×
(
6!× 28
)
×(6!)×(16!) ≈ 5.37×1027 ≈ 292.
2An encryption method is “good” if it can produce unintelligible images.
Note that the number of “good” encryption methods may be larger if a
looser definition of “unintelligible images” is used.
3TABLE II
THE NUMBER OF GOOD ENCRYPTION METHODS OF EACH HUFFMAN
TABLE (TABLE 3.6 OF [16]).
Huffman table Number of good encryption methods
B-10 3!
B-12 7!× 26
B-13 6!× 28
B-14 6!
B-15 16!
As a result of the large key space, it was claimed that the
scheme is sufficiently secure. In the next section, we will
point out that this claim is not grounded.
In [16], an additional measure is also suggested to further
enhance the security against plaintext attacks – reshuffling
the Huffman tables after a certain number of frames. In the
following, we will mainly consider the basic scheme without
the reshuffling mechanism. The effect of the reshuffling
mechanism will be discussed later in Sect. IV.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS
In this section, we re-study the security of the afore-
mentioned MPEG-video encryption scheme based on secret
Huffman tables, and point out that it is not so secure
as claimed in [16], especially against the chosen-plaintext
attack. In this section, the terms and notations in MPEG-2
standard [13] will be used, except those existing in MPEG-1
videos only. The following terms are used throughout this
section to facilitate the description: 1) the term “picture”
is used instead of “frame”, since the encryption scheme is
independent of the syntax differences between a picture and
a frame; 2) macroblock is abbreviated as “MB”; 3) a self-
defined term “MB header” is used to denote the set of all
data elements occurring before the first encoded block in an
MB (if none of the blocks is coded, the MB header is the
MB itself).
A. Ciphertext-only attack
The ciphertext-only attack is the most common attack
in practice, since in general the communication channels
are open to the public, which means that an attacker can
observe a number of ciphertexts and use them to break
an encryption scheme [22], [23]. There are two different
goals in a ciphertext-only attack: recovering the plaintexts
and recovering the secret key. The latter means that the
encryption scheme can be completely broken. This paper
mainly focuses on the recovery of the secret key, i.e.,
the secret Huffman tables in the MPEG-video encryption
scheme under study.
The simplest ciphertext-only attack is to exhaustively
search all possible keys to find the unique correct one, which
is called the brute-force attack [22], [23]. Here, a criterion
is needed to verify each searched key. For the MPEG-video
encryption scheme under study, the occurrence of syntax
errors can serve as such a criterion for detecting wrong
keys (i.e., wrongly guessed Huffman tables). When a wrong
Huffman table is used to decrypt a cipher-video, syntax
errors may occur in the decoding procedure due to (but not
limited to) the following reasons.
• As mentioned in Sect. I of this paper, to ensure the
security against plaintext attacks, there are at least two
different bit lengths in a Huffman table. However, once
the bit length of a data element (i.e., the bit length
of the corresponding VLC-codeword) is wrong, all the
following data elements in the current slice cannot be
correctly decoded. For example, if dct dc size3 is not
decoded correctly in an intra-block, all the following
data elements in the current slice cannot be correctly
located and decoded.
• For each Huffman table, not all VLC-codewords are
valid. For example, in Table B-10, all VLC-codewords
have less than 7 zero bits and the prefix “0000 0010”
never occurs.
• There always exist 23 continuous zero bits between two
adjacent MBs.
• There may exist some marker bits (must be “1”) in the
bit stream:
– (not valid for MPEG-1 videos) when
concealment motion vectors = 1 in an
intra-block, there exists a marker bit in the MB
header;
– (for MPEG-1 videos only) in D-picture, the last
bit of each MB must be a marker bit named
end of macroblock.
• There exist some constraints on the decoded data ele-
ments:
– each decoded DCT coefficient should not be out
of the range [−2048,+2047] after quantization;
– each decoded motion vector should not be out of
the range defined in Table 7-8 of the MPEG-2
standard [13], and must be within the reference
picture after adding the coordinates of the predicted
MB.
• There must be an EOB VLC-codeword at the end of
each block, before which the total number of decoded
DCT coefficients must not be greater than 64.
• The number of MBs within each picture should not be
greater than a maximal value.
• Some slice headers may be skipped when the video is
decoded with wrong Huffman tables, which is forbid-
den for most videos (for example, the MPEG-1 video
and the MPEG-2 video with a restricted slice structure).
3Italic symbols mean data elements defined in the MPEG-2 standard, or
in the MPEG-1 standard if it does not defined in the MPEG-2 standard.
For example, here “dct dc size” denotes the bit size of a DC differential
value, as defined in Sect. 7.2.1 of [13].
4By detecting the above syntax errors occurring in the de-
coding procedure, one can distinguish most wrong Huffman
tables. In addition, there generally exist a lot of information
redundancies in each decoded block, MB, slice, picture
and between adjacent blocks, MBs, pictures and frames.
Therefore, even when no syntax error is detected, one can
still distinguish the wrong Huffman table if a meaningless
picture or a number of slices are decoded or if there exists
excessive noise between many adjacent blocks.
Now, let us see how frequently these syntax errors occur.
To make things simpler, denote the average probability of
occurrence of a syntax error at each syntax element by p.
Then, for a picture with L syntax elements, the probability
that at least one syntax error occurs within this picture will
be P (L) = 1 − (1 − p)L. For an MPEG-1 video of size
M × N , the number of syntax elements is about 6MNλ,
where λ is a factor determined by the average number of
syntax elements in each block and ranges roughly from
1/64 to 1. As an example, taking M = 176, N = 144,
λ = 1/64 and p = 0.001, one can easily calculate and
obtain L = 2376 and P (L) ≈ 0.9072. Since the value of
λ is generally larger than 1/64 and the value of p might
not be so small, it is generally a high-probability event to
observe at least one syntax error within one MPEG-picture.
Note that in reality the values of p and λ vary in a wide
range due to the following reasons: 1) there are a lot of
possibilities of encoding a video within the framework of
MPEG standards; 2) there are some optional data elements in
MEPG standards; 3) the occurrence of some kinds of syntax
elements depends on the contents of the encoded blocks
or other syntax elements; 4) different blocks correspond to
different distributions of DCT coefficients, which directly
influence the values of λ and p; 5) different Huffman tables
(especially these short VLC-entries) correspond to different
value of p. Therefore, instead of estimating the values of p
and L, the efficiency of the syntax-error detection process
will be shown by carrying out experiments on some sample
videos.
Because the five Huffman tables are used for different
parts of the whole video bit-stream, it is possible to sepa-
rately guess them one by one. This means that one can use
the so-called divide-and-conquer (DAC) attack [22], [23] to
break the MPEG-video encryption scheme. In other words,
the key space of the encryption scheme will be the sum, not
the product, of the sub-spaces of the five tables. Next, let
us see how to separately break the five Huffman tables by
detecting syntax errors in the video decoding procedure.
1) Reconstructing Table B-10: Following the MPEG-2
standard, Tables B-12/13/14/15 are all independent of the
decoding of the first MB header in a slice4, which makes
the separate reconstruction of Table B-10 possible. When a
wrong Table B-10 is used, the following syntax errors may
occur when the first MB header of a slice is decoded.
4All other MBs cannot be located without knowing Tables B-12/13/14/15.
• Some decoded motion vectors may be invalid, espe-
cially for those MBs near the picture edge.
• When concealment motion vectors = 1 in an intra-
block, the marker bit in the MB will be wrong (i.e.,
equal to 0) with a probability of 0.5 (under the as-
sumption that each bit in the video stream is distributed
uniformly).
• When macroblock pattern = 1, “0000 0000 0” never
occurs in coded block pattern encoded by Table B-9.
Note that in each slice only the first MB header can be used
to detect syntax errors about Table B-10, so the average
number of involved syntax elements in each block (i.e.,
the value of λ corresponding to this table) may be too
small, especially for pictures with a small number of slices
and/or slow motion. When such an event happens, one has to
exhaustively search through Table B-10 and other Huffman
tables. Experiments showed that this event really happened
for many MPEG videos.
2) Reconstructing Table B-14: Since all DCT coefficients
in a non-intra MB are encoded with Table B-14, syntax
errors may occur when continuous non-intra MBs in a slice
are decoded with a wrong Table B-14. Because most MBs in
a P/B-picture are non-intra MBs, the occurrence probability
of syntax errors (i.e., the value of p corresponding to this
table) will be relatively high.
To test how frequently syntax errors of this kind occur
in real attacks, we observed the decoding process by ex-
changing the following two VLC-entries in Table B-14 –
“11s” and “011s”, which represent RLE-codewords (0,1) and
(1,1), respectively5. For a large number of test MPEG-1/2
videos, syntax errors started to occur after a few number of
MBs were decoded. See Fig. 1 for the decoding results of
an MPEG-1 video “Carphone” (of size 176 × 144) and an
MPEG-2 video “Tennis”6 (of size 704× 576). If the whole
Huffman table is heavily shuffled, syntax errors will occur
even more frequently.
3) Reconstructing Table B-12: Once Table B-14 is recon-
structed, Table B-12 can be further exhaustively searched
in intra MBs with intra vlc format = 0. If the attacker
can get at least one MPEG-1 cipher-video, Table B-12 can
always be broken separately (Table B-15 is not used in
MPEG-1 videos, which means intra vlc format = 0). If
all intra MBs in all known plain-videos are encoded with
intra vlc format = 1, Table B-12 has to be exhaustively
searched together with Table B-15 (see below), which is
generally a rare event when an attacker can collect a number
of cipher-pictures to carry the ciphertext-only attack.
In the case that only two VLC-codewords, “00” and
“01”, in Table B-12 were swapped, we tested the decoding
results of some MPEG-1/2 videos. Figure 2 gives the results
5The two VLC-codewords were chosen due to their frequent occurrence
in the MPEG-1/2 video stream.
6The 1st picture of “Tennis” is encoded with intra vlc format = 1,
while the 2nd picture with intra vlc format = 0.
5a) b)
c) d)
Fig. 1. The decoded results of an MPEG-1 video “Carphone” and an
MPEG-2 video “Tennis”, when only two VLC-codewords were exchanged
in Table B-14: a) the 2nd picture of “Carphone”; b) the decoded 2nd
picture of “Carphone”; c) the 2nd picture of “Tennis”; d) the decoded 2nd
picture of “Tennis”. The light grey areas in the decoded frames denote
decoding failures caused by syntax errors (the same hereinafter). Note that
the decoded pictures are displayed as raw data (i.e., the differential pictures)
since the reference I-pictures are normally unknown at this stage.
of the MPEG-1 video “Carphone” and the MPEG-2 video
“Tennis”. One can see that the syntax errors still occur very
frequently. Note that the swapped VLC-codewords have the
same bit length, so a stronger shuffling of Table B-12 shall
cause much more syntax errors.
4) Reconstructing Table B-15: If Table B-12 has
been successfully guessed, Table B-15 can be exhaus-
tively searched in luminance blocks of intra MBs with
intra vlc format = 1, just like the case of reconstructing
Table B-14. If Table B-12 cannot be separately broken,
Tables B-12 and B-15 have to be exhaustively searched
together.
By swapping “10s” and “010s”, which represent (0,1) and
(1,1), respectively, in Table B-15, we tested the decoding
results of some MPEG-2 videos (note that this table is not
used in the MPEG-1 standard). Figure 3 gives the results of
the MPEG-2 video “Tennis”. It can be seen again that many
syntax errors still occur.
5) Reconstructing Table B-13: After Tables B-12, 14 and
15 are broken, Table B-13 can be exhaustively searched in
chrominance blocks of intra MBs. If there are intra MBs
with intra vlc format = 0, Table B-13 can be exhaustively
broken immediately after Table B-14 is broken, without
knowing Table B-15.
By exchanging two VLC-codewords, “01” and “10”, in
Table B-13, we tested the decoding results of some MPEG-
1/2 videos. The results corresponding to the MPEG-1 video
a) b)
c) d)
Fig. 2. The decoded results of the MPEG-1 video “Carphone” and the
MPEG-2 video “Tennis”, when only two VLC-codewords were exchanged
in Table B-12: a) the 1st picture of “Carphone”; b) the decoded 1st picture
of “Carphone”; c) the 1st picture of “Tennis”; d) the decoded 1st picture
of “Tennis”.
a) b)
Fig. 3. The decoded result of the MPEG-2 video “Tennis”, when only
two VLC-codewords were exchanged in Table B-15: a) the 1st picture of
the original video; b) the decoded 1st picture.
“Carphone” and the MPEG-2 video “Tennis” are shown in
Fig. 4. Again, many syntax errors can be observed. Due to a
similar reason in the case of Table B-12, even more syntax
errors are expected in a real shuffling of Table B-13.
Finally, based on the above analysis and experimental
results, let us estimate the complexity of the above DAC
attack under four different conditions as follows:
• when Table B-10 is separately reconstructed:
– when Table B-12 is separately searched: (3!) +
(7!× 26) + (6!× 28) + (6!) + (16!) ≈ 244.3;
– when Table B-12 is searched together with Table B-
15: (3!)+(7!×26)×(16!)+(6!×28)+(6!) ≈ 262.5;
• when Table B-10 is not separately reconstructed:
– when Table B-12 is separately searched: (3!) ×
((7!× 26) + (6!× 28) + (6!) + (16!)) ≈ 246.8;
– when Table B-12 is searched together with Table
6a) b)
c) d)
Fig. 4. The decoded results of the MPEG-1 video “Carphone” and the
MPEG-2 video “Tennis”, when only two VLC-codewords were exchanged
in Table B-13: a) the 1st picture of “Carphone”; b) the decoded 1st picture
of “Carphone”; c) the 1st picture of “Tennis”; d) the decoded 1st picture
of “Tennis”.
B-15: (3!)× ((7!×26)× (16!)+(6!×28)+(6!)) ≈
265.1.
One can see that in all cases the complexity will be much
smaller than the one given in [16]: (3!)× (7!× 26)× (6!×
28) × (6!) × (16!) ≈ 292. Considering that Table B-12 can
be separately searched in most cases, this Huffman table
based encryption can be easily broken with a practically
small complexity.
As discussed above, since each picture of a cipher-video
contains a large number of VLC data elements, syntax errors
about Tables B-12, B-13, B-14 and B-15 will generally
occur in each picture with a relatively high probability.
That is, except Table B-10, all other Huffman tables can
be separately broken in most cases, where note that Table
B-10 makes the smallest contribution to the whole key space
among all the five tables. So, it is expected that only a
few number of cipher-pictures (or even a few number of
consecutive cipher-slices) is enough to carry out the above
DAC attack effectively.
B. Partial-key attack
There exists another serious defect in the MPEG-video
encryption scheme under study: with a partially-recovered
key (i.e., partial entries of the Huffman tables), it is still
possible to decrypt a cipher-video, if this cipher-video does
not contain any undetermined entries in the Huffman tables.
For example, if the “Escape” entry in Table B-14 or B-
15 is not reconstructed, one can still use the partially-
reconstructed Huffman tables to decrypt a cipher-video that
does not contain Escape DCT coefficients. Thus, the com-
plexity of finding a practicable Huffman table is generally
smaller than the complexity of exactly recovering the whole
Huffman table itself, where the word “practicable” means
that a partially-reconstructed Huffman table can be used
to decrypt some specific target ciphertexts, though not all
possible ciphertexts.
Furthermore, Table B-15 is a very special Huffman table,
since it never occurs in MPEG-1 videos and may not occur
in some MPEG-2 videos as well. So, Table B-15 can be
simply neglected when breaking such videos, which means
that Table B-12 can always be searched separately. In this
case, the key space under the DAC ciphertext-only attack
becomes even smaller:
• when Table B-10 is separately reconstructed: (3!) +
(7!× 26) + (6!× 28) + (6!) = 507606 ≈ 219.0;
• when Table B-10 is not separately reconstructed: (3!)×
((7!× 26) + (6!× 28) + (6!)) = 3045600 ≈ 221.5.
One can see that the key space is so small that it is even
possible to find the secret Huffman tables within seconds on
a PC with a 1GHz CPU (note that 1G= 230 ≫ 221.5).
C. Chosen-plaintext attack
The chosen-plaintext attack is a very strong attack, in
which one can (intentionally) choose some plaintexts and
observe the corresponding ciphertexts to break an encryption
scheme [22], [23]. With the help of some chosen plaintexts
and ciphertexts, it is possible to directly determine the secret
Huffman tables without exhaustively guessing them in all
possible candidates. In the following, we show how to
choose the data elements in a plain-video to carry out a
successful chosen-plaintext attack.
1) Reconstructing Table B-10: Choose a P/B-picture so
that all MBs are encoded as “Not Coded”, i.e., only MB
headers occur in this picture and all blocks are skipped.
Given any two MBs in a slice, one can easily locate the
23 zero bits between the two MBs and all data elements
occurring before motion vectors in the first MB header. Note
that the data elements in the second MB header can be
intentionally chosen to facilitate such a locating procedure.
Then, one can extract a bit segment from the first MB
header, which is composed of two or four motion vectors. In
the extracted bit segment, the values of motion residuals,
dmvectors and the sign bits of the motion vectors can
be chosen to uniquely distinguish each motion code, i.e.,
each VLC-codeword encoded with the secret Table B-10.
If necessary, f code[r][s] can also be intentionally chosen
to help the extraction of the VLC-encoded motion codes.
By choosing the values of 17 consecutive motion codes to
be 0, ..., 16, respectively, all entries in Table B-10 can be
uniquely determined. Apparently, to completely break Table
B-10, only a few MBs (not a full picture) are needed.
72) Reconstructing Table B-14: After reconstructing Table
B-10, one can continue to break Table B-14 in non-intra
MBs. The entries in Table B-14 can be reconstructed as
follows:
• EOB and Escape entries: At the beginning of the first
MB in a slice, choose the following two plain-blocks (in
the zigzag scanning order, the same hereinafter): block
#1 – “
rune︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0, levele, 0, · · ·”, block #2 – “
rune︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0,
−levele, 0, · · ·”, where (rune, levele) forms an Escape
RLE-codeword (i.e., not a valid entry in Table B-14).
Then, the video bitstream corresponding to the two
plain-blocks will be: “Escape, rune, levele, EOB, Es-
cape, rune, −levele, EOB”. By choosing rune, levele
to be some special values and locating the two fixed-
length bit strings: “rune, levele” and “rune, −levele”,
it is easy to determine the Escape and EOB VLC-
codewords of Table B-14.
• Other entries: Choose a block with two RLE-
codewords: “
run︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0, level,
rune︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0, levele, 0, · · ·”
where (run, level) is a valid entry in Table B-14
and (rune, levele) is an Escape RLE-codeword. By
choosing (rune, levele) properly, one can easily extract
the VLC-codeword of (run, level) from the bit stream.
Repeating this process for all RLE-codewords in Table
B-14, one can completely recover the whole Table B-
14.
In the above reconstruction process, the number of required
blocks is equal to the number of entries in Table B-14, which
means only tens of MBs.
3) Reconstructing Tables B-12 and B-13: Since AC co-
efficients of intra-blocks are encoded in a similar way to the
motion vectors, the method of reconstructing Table B-10 can
also be used to break Tables B-12 and B-13. To break the
entry corresponding to dct dc size = s, choose an intra-
block as follows: “level,
63︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0”, where level has s sig-
nificant bits. Then, the video bitstream corresponding to this
block will be “dct dc size, dc dct differential, EOB”.
Since EOB and dc dct differential are both known, it is
easy to determine the VLC-encoded dct dc size. Given 12
luminance blocks with s = 0 ∼ 11, Table B-12 can be
completely reconstructed. Similarly, given 12 chrominance
blocks with s = 0 ∼ 11, Table B-13 can be completely
reconstructed. Apparently, the number of required chosen
MBs is 3, 6 or 12 according to the value of chroma format
(4, 2 or 1).
4) Reconstructing Table B-15: After reconstructing Ta-
bles B-12 and B-13, one can break Table B-15 by choosing
some intra-blocks, in the same way of reconstructing Table
B-14.
As a whole, one can see that only tens of chosen MBs
are enough to break all the five secret Huffman tables. When
the picture is not too small, this means that only one chosen
picture is enough to break the whole encryption scheme. So
the MPEG-video encryption scheme is very weak against
chosen-plaintext attack.
D. Known-plaintext attack
The known-plaintext attack is a weak version of chosen-
plaintext attack, in which one can only passively observe a
number of plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts to
break an encryption scheme [22], [23].
Apparently, if some chosen blocks mentioned in the
above-mentioned chosen-plaintext attack are observed in
a known-plaintext attack, the corresponding entries in the
involved Huffman tables can be immediately reconstructed.
In addition, the FLC (fixed-length coding) data element
following dct dc size can be used in known-plaintext attack
to uniquely locate dct dc size. This means that Tables
B-12 and B-13 may be reconstructed directly. Also, the
reconstructed VLC-entries in a Huffman table can be used to
locate other undetermined VLC-entries and to detect wrong
candidate entries, which can further reduce the attack com-
plexity. Generally speaking, the complexity of the known-
plaintext attack shall be much smaller than the complexity
of the DAC brute-force attack, though more plain-MBs are
required as compared with chosen-plaintext attack.
IV. IMPROVING THE MPEG-VIDEO ENCRYPTION
SCHEME
Though the main focus of this cryptanalysis paper is to
point out some security flaws of the MPEG video encryption
scheme proposed in [16], in this section we give a brief
discussion on how to improve the security of the MPEG
video encryption scheme under study, hoping that more
sequential studies in this research area can be motivated.
To improve the security of the MPEG-video encryption
scheme, a simple way is to change the Huffman tables
frequently. In [16], it was suggested to reshuffle the Huffman
tables after certain number of frames. Generally speaking,
these reshuffling operations might be enough to provide an
acceptable resistance against ciphertext-only attack. How-
ever, even reshuffling these Huffman tables frame by frame
is generally not sufficient for the security against the above
chosen-plaintext attack, since a few number of slices may be
enough to break the secret Huffman tables. From the most
conservative point of view, one has to reshuffle the Huffman
tables for each VLC-codeword. Such a heavy reshuffling
process will dramatically reduce the speed of the whole
system and become impractical in many real applications.
Another possible solution is to use multiple Huffman
tables as suggested in [8], [17]–[19]. As a typical imple-
mentation of this kind of MHT-encryption schemes, a stream
cipher (or a secure PRNG) is adopted to determine the secret
Huffman table from multiple candidate tables for each VLC-
codeword. However, as is well known in cryptology, a stream
8cipher is not secure against plaintext attacks if the key is
reused to encrypt more than two plain messages. Thus, in
real applications, to further guarantee the security of this
MHT-encryption scheme against plaintext attacks, one of
the following practical measures may be adopted to avoid
potential security defects that may arise from the embedded
stream cipher.
• Avoiding reuse of the same secret key to encrypt two
videos, i.e., changing the secret key for different videos:
this measure has to be used together with a key man-
agement system and may not be very useful in low-cost
video applications (such as storage of private videos in
personal computers and mobile devices).
• Assigning a unique ID (UID) for each video (by the
manufacturer or by the end user), and then using the
UID to initialize the stream cipher together with the
secret key: this measure can be considered as a special
case of the above measure, but it can work without a
key management system.
• Using plaintext or ciphertext feedback to make the
stream cipher dependent on the whole plain-video: this
measure will bring up an error-propagation problem,
but can work well in error-free environments.
• Combining the secret selection of the Huffman tables
with a block cipher to construct a product cipher: the
block cipher should be sufficiently simple and fast,
and can even be insecure when used separately (for
example, with a small block size). This measure may
lead to some new designs of MPEG video encryption
schemes and needs future studies.
Finally, note that the security defects about the DAC brute-
force attack and the partial-key attack cannot be essentially
avoided even with the above countermeasures, since they are
actually caused by the inherent feature of an MPEG-video’s
syntax structure. This implies that only using secret Huffman
tables is not sufficient to provide an acceptable security level
for all MPEG-videos. Some more powerful techniques, such
as secret permutation of DCT coefficients and encryption
of VLC indices [9]–[11], have to be introduced to achieve
such a goal for MPEG-video encryption. In future, we will
investigate how to combine different encryption methods to
design MPEG-video encryption scheme with high level of
security.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analyzed the security of a recently-
proposed MPEG-video encryption scheme, which bases its
security of the use of some secret Huffman tables. As
a result, it is found that the scheme is not sufficiently
secure against DAC (divide-and-conquer) brute-force attack
and known-plaintext attack, and is very weak against the
chosen-plaintext attack. Another serious security defect of
this scheme is that a partially-known key may be used to
decrypt some cipher-videos, which further causes a reduction
of the key space. Based on our cryptanalytic results, a brief
discussion is also given on how to further improve the
security of the MPEG-video encryption scheme under study.
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